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of-use#LAATHE  ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE  TODAY*
MARTHA  A.  FIELDt
Since  1941,  when  the  Supreme  Court  decided  Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co.,'  abstention  has  become  an  accepted
procedure  in  the  federal  courts.  By  abstention  I  refer  to
"Pullman abstention,"  which  comes  into  play  when  a  federal
court is faced with an unclear issue of state law whose resolution
might avoid or modify a federal  constitutional question.  I am not
going  to  discuss  the  quite  different  doctrine,  embodied  in  the
Younger v.  Harris decision,2  counseling  against federal  interfer-
ence  with  state  criminal  proceedings,  although  that doctrine  as
well  is sometimes termed  "abstention."
Pullman abstention  has as  its purpose  avoiding federal court
error  on  state  law  questions  that arise  in  federal constitutional
cases and that are within the federal courts' pendent jurisdiction.
Two  risks  are thought  to  result from  a federal  court ruling  er-
roneously on such state issues: The court may needlessly have to
reach  a  federal  constitutional  issue  that a proper interpretation
of state  law  does  not in  fact  present;  or  the federal  court may
interfere with legitimate state  policy by interpreting state legisla-
tion  more  narrowly  than  the  state judiciary  would  interpret  it.
The mechanism  for avoiding  federal  error in the interpretation
of state law  is  to remit the parties to the state courts  for decision
of the unclear state law question.  The parties retain the right to
return to the federal forum  for decision of the  federal  issues in
the case,3 unless the state question proves  dispositive of the con-
troversy. Indeed,  the federal court usually  retains jurisdiction of
the  lawsuit while the  parties pursue their state law remedies. 4
* This  Article  was developed  from  a speech  delivered at  the 46th  Annual Judicial
Conference  of the  Fourth  Circuit,  held  at  White  Sulphur  Springs,  West  Virginia,  in
june  1976.
t  Associate  Professor  of  Law,  University  of Pennsylvania.  A.B.  1965,  Radcliffe
College;  J.D.  1968,  University  of Chicago  Law  School.  Member,  District  of Columbia
Bar.
1 312  U.S.  496 (1941).
2 401  U.S. 37 (1971).
3 See England  v.  Louisiana State Bd. of Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S. 411  (1964).
4 For  a more  thorough  exposition  of the basics  of the Pullman abstention  doctrine
and  the  author's  views  concerning  it,  see  Field,  Abstention  in  Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122  U.  PA.  L. REv.  1071  (1974).
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The  basic  theory  behind Pullman abstention  may seem  at-
tractive,  in  that erroneous  decisions  are minimized  by  splitting
the  lawsuit  and  allowing  each jurisdiction,  state  and  federal,  to
make an authoritative  pronouncement on its own  law.  From the
outset, however, Pullman abstention has proved far from ideal in
practice.  The  extreme  delays  inherent  in  the abstention  proce-
dure,  and  the  attendant  expense,  have  been  chronicled  many
times.  Essentially,  the  parties  to  a  case  in  which  abstention  is
ordered must undergo  two lawsuits instead of one, because their
cause  is  bifurcated  between  state  and  federal  courts.  When  a
federal court abstains  in an action  before  it, the  plaintiffs must
commence a new lawsuit in state trial court, usually a declaratory
judgment action,  to have the unclear issue of state  law resolved.
They must work their way up through the state appellate system,
usually  without  getting  any  priority  on  crowded  state  dockets,
before  the state  issue  is  settled,  so  that they  can  return  to  the
federal system for resolution of federal  issues, with the attendant
appeals.'  The prospect is hardly a happy one for litigants. It may
deter them from seeking a federal forum in the first instance, or
it may, once abstention is ordered, induce them to cut their costs
by presenting  all  issues  to the state court for  decision  and waiv-
ing their right to return to  federal  court on the federal  issues.6
Plaintiffs  in  federal constitutional  cases  seem  a  singularly  inap-
propriate  group  thus  to  discourage  from  access  to  the  federal
courts.
The  delay  and  expense  inherent  in  the  abstention  proce-
dure are legendary, and have caused some judges and commen-
tators to  bemoan  the doctrine  from  the outset.7  Those  qualities
are  exacerbated,  however,  by  three  less  often  noted  problems
with Pullman abstention, which  I wish to point out here. The first
relates  to  the  reviewability  of abstention  decisions;  the  second
involves  misuse of the abstention  procedure  to accomplish  pur-
' The right to  factfinding  by a  federal  tribunal, see  England  v.  Louisiana  State Bd.
of Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411,  416-17  (1964),  may cause  a  federal  court  at this
stage  to  make  new  factual  findings,  even  concerning  issues  that  the  state  court  has
already  determined.  If  it  should  reach  conclusions  differing  from  those  of the  state
judicial system,  the state and  federal  facets of the lawsuit would  presumably be decided
according to conflicting factual  theories.
6 Voluntary  presentation  of all  issues to  the state court  constitutes  a  waiver  of the
right to return  to the  federal  forum  for adjudication  of the federal  issues.  England  v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,  375  U.S. 411  (1964).
7E.g.,  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167,  180 (1959)  (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Kur-
land,  Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The  Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D.  481  (1959);  Wright,  The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered,  37  TEx.  L.  REV.  815
(1959).
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poses other than clarification  of state law;  the third concerns  the
possibility  that abstention  in  a particular  case  will  not result  in
any  state  supreme  court  pronouncement  on  the  controverted
state  law  question.  I  conclude  that the  abstention  procedure  is
not  worth  its  costs;  if  state court  clarification  of state  issues  is
deemed  necessary, certification  of the issues  directly  to the state
supreme court is a preferable  device.
I.  ISSUES  CONCERNING  PULLMAN ABSTENTION
A.  Reviewability of Abstention Decisions
The law  is  unsettled  concerning  whether  or not abstention
orders are appealable. 8 The Supreme Court has reviewed several
decisions  to  abstain9  without  clearly  resolving  the  issue  of ap-
pealability.  Indeed,  in  one  case  the  Court  reviewed  the absten-
tion  order  while  limiting  its  grant  of certiorari  to  exclude  the
issue of the order's  appealability!"'
There are three possible  avenues  to  appellate  review  of ab-
stention orders. The first would characterize  the orders  as "final
decisions"  appealable under section  1291  of the Judicial Code. 1
This approach  has Supreme Court support, 12 but several absten-
tion orders that the Supreme Court has reviewed  have arguably
been  final  decisions  only  because  the  abstaining  court  had  re-
ferred  all  the  issues  in  the case-federal  as  well  as state-to the
state  judiciary.1 3  The  appellant  was  thus  "effectively  out  of
I Compare 9  MOORE'S  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  110.20[4.-2],  at 251  (2d  ed.  1975)  (taking
the position  that abstention orders  are appealable  as long as no action is  pending in  the
state courts when  abstention  is ordered), with  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE,  STUDY  OF THE
DIVISION  OF  JURISDICTION  BETWEEN  STATE  AND  FEDERAL  COURTS  291-92  (1969)  (dis-
cussed in note 37 infra) (taking the position  that abstention  orders are not appealable).
'See,  e.g.,  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406 U.S.  498 (1972);  NAACP  v.  Ben-
nett,  360  U.S.  471  (1959);  Count), of Allegheny  v.  Frank  Mashuda  Co.,  360  U.S.  185
(1959);  Louisiana  Power & Light Co.  v. City  of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25  (1959).
"'  Louisiana  Power  & Light  Co.  v.  City  of Thibodaux, 360  U.S.  25,  26  n.1  (1959).
There  may be  a reason  peculiar  to that case  rendering the  order appealable:  The case
was an  eminent  domain proceeding,  which  is  an  action  at law,  unlike  the usual Pullman
abstention  proceeding, which  is  an  action in equity.  See notes  21-30  infra & accompany-
ing text. The  Fifth  Circuit had  relied  on this  fact  in holding the  order appealable.  City
of Thibodaux  v.  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Co.,  255  F.2d 774,  777-78  (5th  Cir.  1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S.  25 (1959).
1I  28  U.S.C.  §  1291  (1970).  This  section  gives  the  courts of appeals jurisdiction  to
review;  the Supreme Court  could  then  review their  decisions  under 28  U.S.C.  §  1254
(1970).
12 Idlewild  Bon  Voyage Liquor  Corp. v.  Epstein,  370 U.S.  713, 715 n.2 (1962).
I3  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498  (1972);  Idlewild  Bon  Voyage
Liquor  Corp.  v.  Epstein,  370  U.S.  713,  715  n.2 (1962);  County of Allegheny  v.  Frank
Mashuda  Co.,  360 U.S.  185  (1959);  cf. Turner v.  City  of Memphis, 369  U.S. 350 (1962);THE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
court"'
14  in  those cases to  a greater degree  than he  would be in
the usual abstention  situation, in which  the federal district court
retains jurisdiction of the cause and affords the parties a right to
return  to  federal  court  for  initial determination  of the  federal
issues.  Because  the latter procedure  clearly  is required  today,
15
Pullman abstention decisions deviating  from it should be review-
able  in  any  event  under  the  All  Writs  Act 16  as  abuses  of dis-
cretion.1 7 Decisions that do  follow the proper procedure, on the
other hand, could  not as readily be characterized  as  final under
the  effectively-out-of-court  rationale. One might argue that they
also  are final  because the long road  that litigants must travel  in
order  to  return  to  federal  court may  well  discourage  their re-
turn. Or one might stress the  importance to  the litigants of the
abstention  decision  and the unremediable  hardship  imposed  by
a  wrongful  order  that  is  not  immediately  reviewed.' 8  These
rationales  for  finality,  however,  are uncertain  of success.' 9  Un-
NAACP  v.  Bennett, 360  U.S.  471  (1959)  (in  both Turner and Bennett, the district court
had purported  to refer only  state issues to the state court, but at a time when it was  not
yet established  that  there  is a right after  abstention  to  return to federal  court). Idlewild
is  the  only one of the  above  cases  in which  the Court  made reference  to  the  issue of
reviewability.
14 Idlewild  Bon  Voyage  Liquor  Corp.  v.  Epstein,  370  U.S.  713,  715  n.2  (1962)
(quoting the  court  of appeals'  opinion,  Idlewild  Bon  Voyage  Liquor Corp.  v.  Rohan,
289 F.2d 426,  428 (2d Cir.  1961)).
" England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,  375 U.S. 411  (1964).
16  28  U.S.C. §  1651  (1970).
17  See text accompanying notes  38-40 infra.
1  Cases that  might  provide  a basis for  this  finality  argument include:  Cox Broad-
casting Corp.  v.  Cohn,  420  U.S.  469,  478 (1975);  Gillespie  v.  United  States Steel  Corp.,
379  U.S.  148,  152-54 (1964);  Mercantile  Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,  371  U.S.  555, 557-58
(1963);  Construction  Laborers  v.  Curry, 371  U.S. 542,  548-50  (1963);  Cohen  v. Benefi-
cial  Indus. Loan Corp.,  337 U.S. 541,  545-47  (1949).
In  Cox Broadcasting Corp., Mr. Justice  Rehnquist,  dissenting  from  the Court's con-
clusion of finality  in  that case, gave an explanation of the  Court's holdings of finality  in
Curry and Langdeau, cases  involving review  of state  court decisions, that  would be help-
ful in an argument  that orders of abstention  are final.  He said  that Curry and Langdeau
"are based on  the understandable principle  that where  the proper forum  for trying the
issue joined  in  the  state  courts  depends  upon  the resolution  of the  federal  question
raised  on appeal, sound judicial administration  requires that such a question be decided
by  this  Court, if it  is  to be decided  at all,  sooner rather  than later  in the  course of the
litigation."  420  U.S.  at  506.  Orders  of abstention  similarly  might  be  considered  final
because  of  the  importance  of determining  the  proper  forum  at  the  outset,  though
clearly no review at all  will be  had of abstention  orders unless it is had  immediately.
"  In Catlin  v.  United  States,  324  U.S.  229 (1945),  the Court defined  a final judg-
ment  as  one  that "ends the  litigation  on the  merits  and  leaves nothing  for  the court  to
do but execute  the judgment."  Id. at 233.  See  also Southern  Pac. Co.  v. Gileo,  351  U.S.
493, 495-96  (1956);  Clark  v.  Williard, 292  U.S.  112,  118  (1934).  In Schoenamsgruber  v.
Hamburg  Am.  Line,  294  U.S.  454,  456  (1935),  the Court  held  that an  order  staying
proceedings pending arbitration  was  not final.
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less  one  of  them  is  adopted,  section  1291  is  a  very  limited
means  for review of abstention  orders.
20
A second  possible avenue of review  is section  1292(a) of the
Judicial  Code,  giving  courts  of  appeals  'jurisdiction  of appeals
from:  (1) Interlocutory  orders  of the  district  courts  . . . grant-
ing, continuing,  modifying,  refusing, or dissolving  injunctions..
"21  The  Supreme  Court  could  then  review  the  decisions
under  section  1254  of the Judicial  Code.22  Stays  issued  in  fed-
eral  proceedings  so  that  the  parties  will  repair  to  state  court
could  be  reviewable  under  this  provision  if  they  were  consi-
dered  injunctions  against  the  federal  proceedings.23  They  have
traditionally been  so regarded only in legal proceedings  and  not
in  equitable  ones.  Through  a  series  of  Supreme  Court
decisions, 24 the rule has evolved  that
[a]n  order  staying  or  refusing  to  stay  proceedings  in
the District Court is  appealable under § 1292(a)(1)  only
if  (A)  the  action  in  which  the  order  was  made  is  an
action  which, before  the  fusion  of law  and  equity,  was
by  its  nature  an  action  at  law;  and  (B)  the  stay  was
sought  to  permit  the  prior  determination  of  some
equitable defense or counterclaim.25
Although  little in the  way of reasoning supports this  rule,26
20 Some  court of appeals  cases  hold abstention  orders  final although  the abstaining
court retained jurisdiction.  Druker v.  Sullivan,  458 F.2d  1272 (Ist  Cir.  1972) (seemingly
deeming  all  abstention  orders  "clearly  appealable,"  id.  at  1274  n.3);  Amdur  v.  Lizars,
372  F.2d  103  (4th Cir.  1967)  (saying such  stays  are usually  not appealable  but that the
one  in  question  was  because  it  amounted  to  a  dismissal);  cf.  Kelley  v.  Metropolitan
County  Bd.  of Educ.,  436  F.2d  856  (6th  Cir.  1970),  cert. denied, 409  U.S.  1001  (1972)
(reviewing  as  final  a  stay  to await  Supreme  Court  decisions  because  the  rights of  the
parties  required  immediate  adjudication);  McSurely  v.  McClellan,  426  F.2d  664  (D.C.
Cir.  1970)  (holding  final  a  stay  of federal  civil  proceedings  pending  federal  criminal
proceedings  against  the  defendants  because  of the  indefiniteness  of the  stay  and  be-
cause the defendants'  rights  would be  irretrievably lost  unless  adjudicated  immediately).
9 MOORE's  FEDERAL PRACTICE  110.20[4.-2],  at 251  (2d ed.  1975),  takes the position that
an  abstention  order  is  final, so  long as  the  state  law  action  deferred  to  has  not  com-
menced  at the time  abstention  is ordered.
21 28  U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)  (1970).
221d.  §  1254.  Under  the  same reasoning,  the Supreme  Court could  review  absten-
tion  orders of three-judge courts. See id. § 1253 (1970).
23 Alternatively,  they  would  be  characterized  simply  as  rulings regarding  the  man-
ner  in  which the  proceedings  would  be tried and  would  not be appealable. See  City  of
Morgantown  v.  Royal Ins.  Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257  (1949).
24  Baltimore  Contractors,  Inc.  v.  Bodinger,  348  U.S.  176  (1955);  City  of Morgan-
town v.  Royal  Ins. Co.,  337  U.S.  254 (1949);  Ettelson v.  Metropolitan  Life Ins.  Co.,  317
U.S.  188 (1942).;  Enelow  v.  New York Life Ins. Co.,  293  U.S.  379 (1935).
'
5Jackson  Brewing  Co.  v.  Clarke,  303  F.2d  844,  845 (5th  Cir.)  (footnote  omitted)
(emphasis in  original), cert. denied, 371  U.S.  891  (1962).
26 What reasoning exists  is  too esoteric  to reproduce  in  any detail. The basic theoryTHE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
and  although  it  is  widely  criticized,27  most  courts  still  follow  it
today.  If  it  is  adhered  to,  the  utility  of  section  1292(a)(1)  in
Pullman abstention  cases  is  severely  limited.28  The  second  part
of the  rule,  requiring  that the  purpose of the  stay be  to  allow
prior determination  of an  equitable  defense,  could be  satisfied
if  a  court  were  willing  to  regard  as  equitable  a  declaratory
judgment  action;  it  is  such  an  action  that usually  will  be  com-
menced  in state court after an abstention  order. 29  The first part
builds on  the fact  that prior to  1915  a defendant could present  an equitable defense  to
a legal action only by bringing an independent suit in  equity to enjoin  the action at law.
Therefore,  when  an  equitable  defense  to  an  action  at  law  is  interposed  today,  the
theory is  that the defendant  is  really seeking  the aid of equity  to enjoin the  action,  and
an  order  staying  or  refusing  to  stay  is  one  granting  or  refusing  an  injunction.  This
despite the merger of law  and equity in  1938.
The  rationale,  by  its  terms,  is  not available  when  the defense  is  not  equitable  or
when the original  action is not at law.
The  most  coherent  summary  of the  cases  and  explanation  of how  the  theory
evolved can be  found in  C.  WRIGHT,  FEDERAL  COURTS  460-61  (2d  ed.  1970).
211d.;  9  MOORE's  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  110.20[3],  at  245-46  (2d  ed.  1975).  Many
courts,  including  the Supreme  Court,  have  criticized  the  rule  though  they  have  felt
obliged  to  follow  it.  See,  e.g.,  Chapman  v.  Int'l  Ladies  Garment  Workers'  Union,  401
F.2d 626,  628  (4th Cir.  1968);  Travel  Consultants,  Inc.  v.  Travel  Management  Corp.,
367  F.2d 334  (D.C.  Cir.  1966);  Glen  Oaks  Utils.,  Inc. v. City  of Houston,  280 F.2d 330,
333,  337  (5th  Cir.  1960).  The  Supreme  Court  in  Baltimore  Contractors,  Inc.  v.
Bodinger,  348  U.S.  176,  185  (1955),  felt  that  relief  from  the  rule  must  come  from
Congress, not the Court.
28  Note, however,  that  one  commentator  believes  that  the  rule  does  not  properly
apply  to Pullman abstention  cases  and  that 28  U.S.C.  §  1292(a)(1)  (1970)  allows  appeal
in  those  cases  as  long  as  injunctive  relief  is  sought.  9  MOORE'S  FEDERAL  PRACTICE
110.20[4.-2],  at 251  (2d ed.  1975).  The courts have  not agreed,  however, see Mercury
Motor Express,  Inc.  v. Brinke,  475 F.2d  1086  (5th Cir.  1973);  Louisiana  Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux,  255 F.2d 774,  777 (5th  Cir. 1958),  rev'd on other grounds, 360
U.S. 25  (1959),  discussed in note  10 supra and in Jackson Brewing Co.  v.  Clarke,  303 F.2d
844,  846 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371  U.S.  891  (1962);  Jewell  v.  Davies,  192  F.2d 670 (6th
Cir.  1951),  cert. denied, 343  U.S.  904  (1952);  nor  has  the  American  Law  Institute,  see
note  37 infra & accompanying text.
29  In Jackson  Brewing  Co.  v.  Clarke,  303  F.2d 844,  846 (5th  Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S.  891  (1962),  the  court  regarded  a  declaratory judgment  action  as  analogous,  for
these  purposes,  to the  old  bill  in  equity,  quia timet.  It is  not at all  clear,  however,  that
declaratory  relief would be generally so  regarded.  See, e.g.,  Simler  v.  Connor, 372  U.S.
221,  223  (1963).
It  might  appear  advantageous  to  one  seeking  to  appeal  an  abstention  order  to
characterize  declaratory  relief as  legal  rather than  equitable  with regard  to the  first part
of the rule-requiring that the cause  in  which  the order was  made  be at law.  In  Ameri-
can Safety Equip.  Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co.,  391  F.2d 821,  824-25  (2d Cir.  1968),  the
court held  that the declaratory judgment  action brought before  it should be considered
legal  (because  absent  the  availability  of that  relief  a  legal  action  would  have  been
brought) and  that the stay pending arbitration  was therefore  appealable.
If declaratory judgments were considered  legal,  then Pullman abstention cases  often
would  involve  both  equitable  and  legal  relief  because  requests  for  declaratory  relief
often are joined  to requests for an  injunction.  It is not clear how the law/equity  distinc-
tion  for appeals  should  apply in  a situation  in  which  both  legal  and  equitable  relief  is
sought,  though  a  dominant-purpose  test  or an  essential-nature-of-the-action  test  seems
the  prevalent solution.  See, e.g.,  Western  Geophysical  Co. of Am.,  Inc.  v.  Bolt  Assocs.,
Inc.,  440  F.2d  765,  771  (2d  Cir.  1971);  Schine  v.  Schine,  367  F.2d  685,  688  (2d  Cir.
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would  be  impossible  to  satisfy  in  most Pullman contexts,  how-
ever,  because  Pullman  abstention  cases  ordinarily  will  be  in
equity.
30
In  Glen  Oaks  Utilities, Inc. v.  City  of Houston,'  the  United
States  Court  of Appeals  for  the  Fifth  Circuit, believing  that  a
prior Fifth Circuit decision adhering to the prevailing  law/equity
distinction  "precluded  [it]  from  saying  that stay  orders,  in  all
cases where  the decision of another court is awaited, are injunc-
tive  in  nature and  appealable, '3 2  found  another  way  to  review
stay  orders  under  section  1292(a)(1):  The  court  held  that  the
stay order in question  "was for all practical  purposes, a denial of
the temporar), injunction  which was  sought. '33  Section  1292(a)(1)
1966) (Friendly, J., concurring);  Alexander v.  Pacific  Maritime Ass'n,  332  F.2d 266,  268
(9th  Cir.  1964);  cf. Standard  Chlorine of Del.,  Inc.  v.  Leonard,  384  F.2d  304 (2d  Cir.
1967)  (holding  that  an  action  should  be  considered  equitable  when  both  legal  and
equitable  relief  is  sought  unless  the  equitable  relief  can  be  characterized  as  "merely
incidental,"  id. at 309).  Under  these tests,  the action  would doubtless  usually be consid-
ered  equitable. See note  30 infra. And  even  if the plaintiff in  a Pullman abstention  case
had  the  foresight  to  allege only  declaratory  relief, the  action  might well  be  considered
equitable  rather  than  legal,  under  the  reasoning  of American  Safety Equipment,  because
absent  the  availability  of declaratory  relief  an  injunction  probably  would  have  been
sought. Cf. Skelly  Oil Co. v.  Phillips Petroleum  Co.,  339  U.S. 667, 672-74  (1950)  (exis-
tence of federal question jurisdiction  in  declaratory judgment  proceeding  depends  on
whether  the  action  that  would  have  been  brought,  absent  the  declaratory  procedure,
would  have qualified  for federal  question jurisdiction).
'" To some,  it  is  the  equitable  discretion  of the  federal judge  as  chancellor  that
justifies  the  abstention  procedure  at all,  see  Railroad Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.
496, 500 (1941);  cf. Louisiana Power  & Light Co. v.  City of Thibodaux,  360 U.S. 25,  28
(1959)  (the  Court ordered abstention  in an  eminent domain action  but analogized  that
type  of proceeding  to  an  equitable  action);  Burford  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  319  U.S.  315,
317-18  (1943)  (a  federal court  having jurisdiction  of a  suit to enjoin  enforcement  of a
state  commission's  order  may,  in  its  sound  equitable  discretion,  refuse  to  exercise  its
jurisdiction  if granting  relief  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  public  interest);  Harlow  v.
Ryland,  172  F.2d 784,  786 (8th Cir.  1949) (federal court, as court of law,  must exercise
jurisdiction  to decide  state  law  questions,  unlike other cases  in  which  federal  court,  as
court of equity,  may  in  exceptional  circumstances  decline  to  decide doubtful  questions
of state law),  and  the  usual  Pullman abstention  case  involves  an  attempt to  enjoin state
action  as  unconstitutional.  On  occasion,  however,  the  Court  has  abstained  in  simple
damage actions  without  mentioning  the  issue. Fornaris  v.  Ridge Tool  Co.,  400 U.S.  41
(1970)  (per  curiam);  United  Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Ideal  Cement  Co.,  369  U.S.  134
(1962)  (per curiam).
3, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.  1960).
32Id. at 333.
331d. (emphasis added); see Clean  Air Coordinating Comm. v.  Roth-Adam  Fuel Co.,
465  F.2d 323  (7th Cir.  1972),  cert. denied, 409  U.S.  1117 (1973);  United States  v. Lynd,
301  F.2d 818 (5th  Cir.), cert. denied, 371  U.S. 893  (1962);  Jewell  v.  Davies,  192 F.2d 670,
673 (6th  Cir. 1951),  cert. denied, 343  U.S. 904 (1952);  cf. Mercury  Motor Express,  Inc. v.
Brinke, 475  F.2d  1086  (5th  Cir.  1973)  (holding  a stay order  reviewable  because  it was
accompanied  by  a denial of a preliminary  injunction);  Weiss v. Duberstein,  445 F.2d  1297
(2d  Cir.  1971)  (holding an order  of abstention appealable  under 28  U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(1970)  because  it was  coupled  with  a  denial  of  a motion  for  summary judgment  that
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can  thus  allow  appeal  of some  stay  orders,  even  in  equitable
actions;  it  may,  however,  be  of  limited  utility.  Under  that
rationale,  appeal  is  available, obviously,  only when  a temporary
injunction  is  sought. 3 4  In Glen Oaks,  the court  also  emphasized
that no relief was sought except for  temporary and final  injunc-
tions;  this  could  prove  to limit the rule further.  More basically,
characterizing  a district court's action as a refusal of a temporary
injunction  may not be possible  when  "a  practical  assessment  of
the  case"  shows  "that  the  court's  action  did  not  even  imply  a
preliminary  assessment  of the merits of the claim  for injunctive
relief, including the  claim  of irreparable  injury. '35  The factors
going into an  abstention decision  can  easily be sufficiently inde-
pendent of the merits of the cause that appeal will not lie under
the Glen Oaks rationale.
Apparently  on  the  theory  that  no  appeals  were  available
from stays issued in equitable proceedings, 36 the reporters of the
American  Law  Institute,  writing  in  1969, believed  that  the law
did  not  allow  for  appeal  of abstention  orders.37  They  recom-
mended  retaining the ban  on appeals and allowing  review  only
under  a  third  possible  avenue  of review:  the  All  Writs  Act.38
The All Writs Act would permit review by mandamus when  the
appellate  court  determines  that  the  trial  court  has  abused  its
discretion in staying an action.39  If  this were the exclusive route
34  Cf. Ferrara v.  Louisiana, 443  F.2d 344  (5th Cir.  1971)  (appeal  dismissed because
no injunction  was sought and because the  stay order issued  by the district court was  not
equivalent  to an injunction);  Goldstein v.  Cox, 396  U.S.  471  (1970)  (construction of an
analogous  statute,  28  U.S.C.  §  1253  (1970),  governing  interlocutory  appeals  from
three-judge  courts to United States  Supreme Court).  For these purposes,  preliminary or
temporary  injunctions  are  distinguished  from  temporary  restraining  orders. See,  e.g.,
Grant v. United  States,  282 F.2d  165  (2d Cir.  1960); Pennsylvania  Motor Truck Ass'n  v.
Port of Philadelphia  Marine Terminal  Ass'n,  276  F.2d  931  (3d Cir.  1960);  Connell v.
Dulien Steel Prods.,  Inc.,  240 F.2d 414 (5th  Cir. 1957).
35  Dellinger  v. Mitchell,  442  F.2d 782, 789  (D.C.  Cir.  1971); see Switzerland  Cheese
Ass'n  v. E.  Home's Mkt.,  Inc.,  385 U.S.  23,  25 (1966).
"
6 See  43 ALl  PROCEEDINGS  365-66  (1966)  (remarks of Judge Friendly  and  Profes-
sor Field).
" The  reporters'  draft  made no  express  provision  for review  of abstention orders
and  their commentary  indicated  their  belief that  the  absence  of an  express  provision
would  preclude  appellate  review  except  under  the  All  Writs  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §  1651
(1970).  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at 291-92.
38  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at 291-92. The All Writs  Act is codified
at 28  U.S.C. § 1651  (1970).
39See  Dellinger  v.  Mitchell,  442  F.2d  782  (D.C.  Cir.  1971);  ACF  Indus.,  Inc.  v.
Guinn, 384  F.2d  15  (5th  Cir. 1967),  cert. denied, 390  U.S.  949 (1968);  Leesona  Corp. v.
Cotwool  Mfg. Corp.,  308 F.2d 895  (4th  Cir. 1962);  Lyons  v. Westinghouse Elec.  Corp.,
222 F.2d  184 (2d Cir. 1955);  International  Nickel Co. v.  Martin J.  Barry, Inc.,  204 F.2d
583, 585  (4th Cir.  1953);  Kerotest Mfg. Co. v.  C-O Two  Fire Equip.  Co.,  342  U.S.  180,
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to review,  as the American Law Institute prefers, 40  review would
be limited to  extraordinary cases.
Thus  far, the discussion  has  concerned  primarily  review  of
lower court decisions  to  abstain.  When a court refuses  a request
for  abstention  and instead  proceeds  with  the  cause,  the  ruling
clearly  is  reviewable,  but  typically  it  is  not  reviewed  immedi-
ately;41 it  is reviewed  only  after  the  trial court has  disposed  of
185 (1952);  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at 291-92.
Query  whether  abstention  is  appropriately  deemed  a  discretionary  doctrine,  be-
cause federal  appellate courts both reverse lower court orders of abstention, e.g.,  Griffin
v.  County School  Bd.,  377  U.S.  218 (1964);  Turner v.  City of Memphis,  369  U.S.  350
(1962),  and order  abstention  themselves  in  the  first instance, e.g.,  Harrison  v.  NAACP,
360 U.S.  167  (1959);  Railroad  Comm'n  v.  Pullman Co.,  312 U.S.  496 (1941),  and do not
seem  in any  case  to allow  the district court's  ruling to stand  for the  simple reason  that
the  district  court so  ruled, see  Clay  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office,  363  U.S.  207,  223  n.17  (1960)
(Black, J.,  dissenting). But see, e.g.,  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at 29,  quoted
in note 30 supra; Harman v.  Forssenius, 380 U.S.  528, 534, 537  (1965);  Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v.  City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.  25, 27  n.2 (1959).  Were mandamus the sole
route  to  appellate  review,  however,  as  it sometimes  is  today, see  Dellinger  v.  Mitchell,
442 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir.  1971),  only egregious  error on the part of the trial court would
be  correctible  and  less  evident error  would  be  left  undisturbed.  In  effect,  therefore,
trial courts would be accorded a measure of discretion.
0 AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE,  supra note 8,  at 291-92.
41 Of the  three  avenues  of review  discussed  above,  the  All  Writs  Act,  28  U.S.C.
§  1651  (1970),  could  conceivably  allow  immediate  review  of refusals  to  abstain.  The
American  Law  Institute,  endorsing the  All Writs  Act procedure,  noted that mandamus
would  be available  "[i]f  the  rare case  should  ever  arise  in  which  refusal  to abstain  was
such  an  improvident  exercise  of discretion  vested  in  the  district  court  that  appellate
review was indicated ..  " AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at 292.
The  only  other  avenue  to  immediate  review  of refusals  to  abstain  would  involve
characterizing a request for abstention  as a request  for an injunction against the federal
proceeding.  If  that characterization  were accepted  across  the board, then  grants or re-
fusals  of  the  requested  "injunctive"  relief  would  be  appealable  under  28  U.S.C.
§  1292(a)(1)  (1970).  As  noted above,  however, text accompanying notes  21-30 supra, the
law/equity distinction  prevents  this  avenue of review from  having much significance  in
the Pullman abstention  context. And  advocates of abolition of the distinction  would  not
increase  instances  of appealability;  usually  their  position  is  that  appeals  should  be  al-
lowed  in  none  of these  cases,  not in  all  of them. See, e.g.,  C.  WRIGHT, supra note  26,  at
460-61;  9  MOORE'S  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  110.20[3],  at 245-46  (2d ed.  1975). But see  Glen
Oaks  Utils.,  Inc. v.  City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330,  333 (5th Cir. 1960).
The  other  rationale  for appealability  under  §  1292(a)()-the Glen Oaks, or denial-
of-temporary-injunction  rationale-would  be  available only  for  grants  of requests  for
abstention,  not for refusals  to abstain.  Unlike a decision  to abstain,  which  amounts  to a
decision  not  to  grant  the  requested  relief  for  the  time  being  at  least,  a  decision  to
proceed  with  the  cause  cannot  be  characterized  as  an  interlocutory  order  "granting,
continuing,  modifying,  refusing  or  dissolving  injunctions,  or  refusing  to  dissolve  or
modify  injunctions,"  28  U.S.C.  §  1292(a)(1)  (1970),  because  it says  nothing bearing  on
the grant or refusal of the requested relief.
Moreover, a decision  not to abstain  has  never been held  final and hence appealable
under  28  U.S.C.  §  1291  (1970).  (A  finality  argument  would  be  difficult  to make,  be-
cause the court that decides not  to abstain  generally  proceeds directly  to determine  the
merits.  Note,  however,  that  Mr.  Justice  Rehnquist's  point,  quoted  in  note  18  supra,
would support finality here.)
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the  case  on  its  merits. 42  Problems  concerning  piecemeal  review
are not present,  therefore,  but the  practice  has  problems  of its
own:  It means  that a party who  has had  his case decided on the
merits in the federal district court and the court of appeals may
face an abstention  decision  in  the Supreme Court of the United
States.43  Indeed, that Court may raise the abstention  issue on its
own  motion,  though no mention  has been made of it earlier in
the litigation.44  The parties are then remanded  to state court to
start the litigation anew on state issues, perhaps years  after their
lawsuit began, and the disposition of the federal  issues that have
already been  fully adjudicated  is set aside.45
The costs of such a system are obvious, and yet a solution to
the problem  is not. Although  the current  system  is wasteful,  an
earlier review  would  interrupt  and  delay  the lawsuit, often  un-
necessarily.  The  difficulty  in reaching  an  acceptable  solution  is
largely  a function  of the  looseness  of the standards  for absten-
tion.  Ideally,  the  criteria  for  abstention  should  be  sufficiently
definite that they could  be applied  at the outset of the litigation
42  This  method  of proceeding  obviously  is  not  available  when  the  court's  decision
favors abstention;  unless review  is immediate,  the decision  is not reviewable  at all. 43E.g.,  Harris  County  Comm'rs'  Court  v.  Moore,  420  U.S.  77  (1975);  Harrison  v.
NAACP,  360  U.S.  167 (1959);  Railroad  Comm'n  v. Pullman  Co., 312  U.S.  496  (1941);
cf. Lehman  Bros.  v.  Schein, 416 U.S. 386,  393 (1974)  (Rehnquist, J., concurring)  (com-
plaining  that "petitioners  seek  to  upset  the  result of more than  two  years  of trial  and
appellate  litigation on the basis of a point which they first presented  to the Court of Ap-
peals  upon  petition  for  rehearing");  Hostetter  v.  Idlewild  Bon Voyage  Liquor  Corp.,
377  U.S.  324,  329  (1964)  (refusing  to  hold  under  the  circumstances  that the  district
court sriould have  abstained).
" Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433,  439,  443  (1971)  (dissenting opinions
of Burger,  C.J.  &  Black, J.);  cf. England  v.  Louisiana  State Bd. of Medical  Examiners,
375 U.S. 411  (1964)  (district court abstained  sua sponte);  Harris County Comm'rs' Court
v.  Moore, 420 U.S.  77,  81  & n.3  (1975)  (the parties  had not raised  the  abstention  issue
with any  clarity);  Louisiana Power  & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25  (1959)
(district court abstained sua sponte).
'5 In  Harris  County  Comm'rs'  Court  v.  Moore,  420  U.S.  77  (1975),  for  example,
the  district court  had  enjoined  a  challenged  redistricting  plan  on  the  ground  that  it
violated the  fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court on review directed  the district
court  to abstain  on  the  state  issue  before  reaching  the  federal  constitutional  one. The
state  issue, which  the district court  had  not decided  presumably because  it was  unclear
that  the  plaintiffs  had  raised  it, see  id.  at 81  &  n.2,  was  whether  the redistricting  plan
violated the state constitution.
In Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S. 82  (1970),  the district court had  held  that the chal-
lenged  provisions  violated  both  the  Alaska  Constitution  and  the  Federal  Constitution.
The Supreme Court directed  the  state court  to abstain  on  the state  issue before  reach-
ing the federal one.
In  both  cases,  decision  of the  state  issues  would  not  change  the  posture of the
federal  issue  but  might  simply  affect  the  necessity  of reaching  the  federal  issue.  It
seems unfortunate  for a decision  with this  purpose to be rendered  at such  a late stage,
after  the federal  issue, which  undoubtedly  is in  the case, has been  fully  litigated by  the
parties and has been fully adjudicated by  a three-judge  district court.
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without  substantial  risk  of error;  the  long  process  of litigating
the  question  which  is  the  proper  tribunal  in  which  to  litigate
could thereby be foregone. But because the availability of absten-
tion  depends  primarily  upon  the  degree  of  unclarity  of  state
legal  issues,  and because  some  ambiguity  can  be detected  in al-
most any legal rule,  the instances in  which  abstention  should be
ordered  do not lend themselves  to  any definite codification.
When  the standards  provide such  little  guidance,  it is  dif-
ficult to leave the  subject to  the unreviewable  discretion of trial
judges.  It would  be  particularly  troublesome  to  do  that, in  my
view,  in  instances  when  abstention is ordered,  for  that  decision
can  be enormously important  to  the litigant who  has chosen  the
federal  forum,  and he has  a  statutory  right to  pursue  his cause
there. Even if the  abstention  doctrine  legitimately  modifies  that
right, at least the federal system should assure itself before allow-
ing  the  litigant's  ouster  from  federal  court  that  his  case  falls
within  the scope of the abstention  doctrine.
I  would  suggest, therefore,  allowing  review  of decisions  to
abstain,  as is the practice  today, and clarifying the doctrinal basis
for that review.  (My own approach would be to deem abstention
orders  final  decisions  despite  the retention  of federal jurisdic-
tion, because  of the importance  of the decision  to  the  litigation
and because it contemplates  at least an extensive interruption  in
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.46) It  seems  to me less trouble-
some,  however,  for  refusals  of  requests  for  abstention  to  be
unreviewable. 47  Support for the view  that declining to  abstain in
a  case  appropriate  for abstention  is not nearly  as  serious  as  ab-
staining erroneously  can be found in last Term's decision  in Col-
orado River Water Conservation District v.  United States. There  the
Court  stressed  that  "[a]bstention  from  the  exercise  of federal
jurisdiction  is  the exception,  not the  rule. 'The  doctrine  of ab-
stention  . ..is  an  extraordinary  and  narrow  exception  to  the
duty of a District Court to adjudicate  a controversy  properly be-
fore  it' ,,48 Declining  to  abstain  is not  as  serious  because  federal
" See cases  cited notes  18 & 20 supra.
17 The possibility of immediate review  under the All Writs  Act for abuses of discre-
tion  could  remain.  I  share  the  skepticism  of the American  Law  Institute, however,  that
such  a  case  will ever  arise. See  AMIERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE, supra note 8,  at  292, quoted in
note  41 supra.
48 Colorado  River  Water Conserv.  Dist. v.  United  States,  424  U.S.  800, 813 (1976)
(quoting  County  of Allegheny  v.  Frank  Mashuda  Co.,  360 U.S.  185,  188-89  (1959)).
Elsewhere  in  the  Colorado River case,  Mr. Justice  Brennan  referred-citing  England  v.
Louisiana  State Bd.  of Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411,  415 (1964);  McClellan  v. Car-THE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
jurisdiction  to  decide  the state  issues  does  exist.  Moreover,  dis-
trict  judges'  capability  concerning  state  law  decisionmaking
should  not be  overlooked  or  minimized;  they are  generally  fa-
miliar with  the  law  of the state  in  which they  sit. The strongest
argument in favor of unreviewability  of decisions not to  abstain,
however,  is  avoidance  of the costs of the current system.  Allow-
ing  a trial judge in his unreviewable  discretion  to proceed  with
the  lawsuit,  of which  the  federal court in  any  event does  have
jurisdiction,  seems  to me preferable  to  allowing referral to  state
courts after full adjudication  of the controversy.
Not only should a district court's  refusal to abstain be a final
determination  that  the  case  will  be  adjudicated  in  the  federal
forum.  Also,  raising  the  abstention  issue  for  the  first  time  on
appeal  should not  be permissible.  Nor  should  appellate  courts
abstain  on  their  own  motion.  Abstention  would  thus  be  waiv-
able,  as  it is  not today. 9 Insofar  as  abstention  exists  to protect
the  interests  of the  parties  (especially  the  interest  of the  state
as  a  party),  it  seems  sensible  to  rely  on  the  parties  raising  the
issue,  and  doing  so  at  the  district  court  level,  and  not  unfair
to  preclude  them  if they  do  not  raise  the  issue  at  that  time.
Insofar  as  the doctrine  is  designed  to  protect  federal  interests,
the costs to  the system of entertaining  suggestions  of abstention
after  full determination  of the merits  seem  to  me  too  great  to
justify that practice.
50
In  sum,  I  would  allow  federal courts  to  review lower  court
orders of abstention,  as  they  now  do, because  the need  for re-
view  is greatest in those cases. I  would, however,  take  away fed-
eral  appellate  courts'  power  to order  abstention  in the  first in-
stance,  because  the costs  of abstention  are greatest when  a  case
has already been decided on its merits. Such a rule would aid the
reviewability  problem,  however,  only  by minimizing  the impor-
tance  of the  abstention  device.  It  is  very  far  from  the  current
practice  of allowing  abstention  at either level  of the federal  ap-
pellate  system, even  on the court's own motion.
land,  217  U.S.  268,  281  (1910);  and Cohens  v. Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264,  404
(1821)  (dictum)-to "the  virtually  unflagging  obligation  of the  federal  courts  to  ex-
ercise the jurisdiction  given them."  424 U.S. at 817.
41 See cases cited notes 43-44 supra.
"'  The  federal  interest  that  abstention  sometimes  serves  is  the federal  policy  of
avoiding  federal  constitutional  decisionmaking.  For  an  example,  see  note  68  infra.
When  abstention  is considered  after the  trial court has disposed of the controversy, the
federal  constitutional  questions  have  already  been  decided,  at  least  at the  trial  court
level,  or else the state law has been interpreted  in  such a way  as  to avoid them.
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B.  Misuse of Abstention
The second  problem  that  I  wish to mention concerning  ab-
stention  is  a  tendency  on  the  part  of some  federal  courts  to
utilize  the  abstention  procedure  for  purposes  other  than those
for which it was designed.  As stated earlier, the aim of abstention
is to obtain the correct solution to a difficult and important ques-
tion of state law, in order to facilitate the correct disposition of a
federal lawsuit;  delay  is an unfortunate by-product of the proce-
dure. A survey of abstention  decisions, however, raises the ques-
tion  whether  delay  is  not sometimes  the aim of the abstention
procedure,  and  the  desirability  of obtaining  a  clarifying  state
decision  simply  the  excuse  for  the  delay.  When,  for example,  a
lawsuit  presents  a  federal  constitutional  attack  on  a  state  pro-
gram that does not seem politic at the moment to resolve, absten-
tion  may appear  a convenient  device  for  removing  the  parties
from  federal  court,  for  the  time  being  at  least.  Even  if they
persist  in  demanding  a  federal  forum  to  resolve  their  federal
claims, abstention  will put them off for a number of years.
The principal  standard  for abstention,  which  relates to  un-
clarity in the state issue, is so much a question of degree and is so
subjective  that misuse  of the  abstention  doctrine  cannot  be  de-
tected  with  any  assurance  and  also  cannot  be  controlled  effec-
tively.  Yet,  an  examination  of  a  series  of  abstention  decisions
does  suggest  that  in  situations  in  which  the  enunciated  tests
apply equally, abstention  is sometimes ordered and is sometimes
not,5' and that federal judicial views concerning the merits of the
federal  cause of action  are often  the impetus  for  an abstention
ruling, quite apart from the need for clarification  of state law. A
Justice committed  to  environmental  controls  who  generally  op-
poses abstention,  for example,  may  be the first to abstain  in  an
environmental  case in which the lower court ruling was unfavor-
able to the environmentalists.  The lack  of clarity  in state law  he
detects  to justify  the abstention  seems largely illusory. 5 2  Absten-
11 Compare Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380 U.S.  528  (1965)  and Davis v.  Mann,  377 U.S.
678  (1964)  (in  which  the  Court  ruled  against  abstention because  of  the clarity  of the
state  law  issues), with  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498 (1972),  Fornaris
v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970),  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82  (1970),  and
Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959)  (in  which  the  Court deemed  state  law suffi-
ciently ambiguous  to require abstention).
52  Most  frequently,  Pullman  abstention  cases  involve  individuals  attacking  state
statutes  as violations  of their  civil liberties.  The  plaintiffs'  interests  opposed  to absten-
tion are  individual civil  liberties interests;  state  interests  favor it. See,  e.g.,  Wisconsin  v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433  (1971);  Harman  v. Forssenius,  380 U.S.  528  (1965);  Harri-THE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
tion  then  becomes  merely  a  device  to  set  aside  a  lower  court
ruling thought undesirable for reasons having no relation  to the
abstention doctrine.
53
If I am correct in detecting the existence of this practice, it is
an unconscionable one. A wish to avoid or postpone decision of a
particular  constitutional  issue  should  not  occasion  abstention
when  the federal  tribunal has no real need for state advice  con-
cerning state  law.  Even  if one  accepts  Professor  Bickel's  thesis
that the federal courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) may
properly  invoke justiciability doctrines  to avoid making  decisions
that seem  impolitic,54  the  abstention  doctrine  is  not  an  appro-
son  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959);  Railroad  Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.  496
(1941)  (the most substantial attack  on  the  challenged  order  was  raised  by  intervenors,
claiming unconstitutional  racial discrimination).  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n v. MacMullan,  406
U.S. 498 (1972),  however,  involved  private companies'  attacks on a state statute protect-
ing  the  environment.  Business  interests,  then,  instead  of individual  civil  liberties  in-
terests,  stood  in  the  posture  of opposing  abstention,  and  a  vote  for  abstention  was  a
vote favoring environmental  controls. Mr. Justice  Brennan  authored  the opinion of the
Court  in  Lake  Carriers, an  opinion  that  ordered  abstention.  Although  Mr.  Justice
Brennan's  statements concerning  abstention  in  that  opinion  appear  consistent  with  his
remarks on abstention elsewhere, it is somewhat unusual to find him among the Justices
considering state law "far from  clear," 406 U.S. at 511,  for purposes of ordering  absten-
tion,  when  there  is  dissent on  that  issue. See,  e.g.,  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167
(1959).  The shift in Chief Justice  Burger's  position concerning  abstention  that the Lake
Carriers  situation brought about  is a more  noticeable  one. Earlier  the Chief Justice  had
taken  the  position  that  a state  should  have  the  first opportunity  to  pass  upon a  state
statute without regard  to whether it  is  ambiguous, and  that plaintiffs'  interests  are  ade-
quately served by the availability of a state  forum.  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400 U.S.
433,  440-43  (1971).  The  Chief Justice  also  had  previously  been  rather  quick  to  find
uncertainty  in  state  law,  and  to order  abstention  on  that basis. Id. at  440  n.1.  In Lake
Carriers, however,  the  Chief Justice joined  an  opinion  dissenting  from  the  order  of
abstention;  taking the  position  that the  challenged  state  law,  though  unconstrued,  was
not ambiguous;  and  emphasizing  the  plaintiffs'  right to  choose a  federal  forum  to  ad-
judicate  their controversy.
Mr. Justice Douglas, ordinarily  a vociferous opponent of abstention, see,  e.g.,  Harris
County Comm'rs' Court v.  Moore, 420 U.S.  77,  89 (1975)  (dissenting opinion);  Manard
v.  Miller, 405  U.S. 982 (1972)  (dissent from affirmance of order to abstain);  England  v.
Louisiana State Bd.  of Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S. 411,  423  (1964) (separate opinion);
Clay  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office,  363  U.S.  207,  227  (1960)  (dissenting  opinion);  Harrison  v.
NAACP,  360  U.S.  167,  179  (1959)  (dissenting  opinion),  has  favored  abstention  in en-
vironmental  cases.  He joined  the  majority  in  the Lake Carriers case.  He  also  wrote  for
the  majority  in  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82  (1970),  in  which  the  Supreme  Court
reversed  a three-judge court  decision holding unconstitutional,  under state  and federal
law,  an  Alaska  law  limiting  fishing  rights  on  a  grandfather-clause  basis.  The  Court
ordered abstention  on the state constitutional  issues.
53 The  crucial  difference between  this  illegitimate  use of abstention  and  the  legiti-
mate  use of it to avoid  unnecessary constitutional  decisionmaking,  described  in note 68
infra,  is  that  in  the  latter  case  the  state  issue  is  genuinely  ambiguous  and  state  law
clarification  is sought in  good faith.
" A.  BICKEL,  THE  LEAST  DANGEROUS  BRANCH  111-98  (1962).  But see  Gunther,  The
Subtle  Vices  of the  "Passive Virtues"-A  Comment  on  Principle and Expediency  in Judicial
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priate tool of avoidance. Its inappropriateness for this function is
evident  because  it is  not available  in all constitutional  cases but
only in those that happen to contain state law issues. And unlike
the justiciability  doctrines,  which  bring  the litigation  to  a  close,
abstention  sends the litigants  to state court with a promise of ul-
timate return to the federal court. Sending them on such a jour-
ney  with  an  aim  simply  to  postpone  a  federal  decision  disre-
gards their legitimate interest in not incurring needless  expense.
It  also  adds unnecessarily  to  state court dockets, thereby  ignor-
ing and belittling state court needs to  keep abreast of increasing
caseloads.  If  delaying  constitutional  adjudication  is  ever  a valid
judicial  objective,  abstention,  therefore,  should  not be  its  tool.
Formulating  a  doctrine  that  focuses  on  the  actual  reasons  for
avoiding a  decision,  and that simply postpones  or avoids the de-
cision if that is the aim, would be far preferable  to using absten-
tion to force  an essentially  purposeless state court litigation.
C.  Absence of Input by the State Supreme Court
A  final  point I  wish  to  mention  in  connection  with  absten-
tion is a very simple one, but it is the most fundamental objection
of all:  After  the parties  have undergone  the lengthy process  of
litigating  in  lower  state  courts,  an  abstention  may  be rendered
utterly purposeless in any  given case by the state supreme court
declining  to review the lower court's  ruling. A lower state court's
guess  as  to  how  the  state supreme  court would  decide the  dis-
puted  state  law  issue  may  not be  any  more  informed  than  the
federal court's  would be. And the whole purpose of abstention is
to  obtain  the state supreme court's  pronouncement.  The United
States  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  this  fact  when  it  has  ab-
stained in situations  in which lower state court opinions deciding
the  ambiguous  issue  were  available  but  in  which  the  state  su-
preme  court had  not  spoken. 55  Yet  the  abstention  procedure,
Review,  64  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1 (1964);  Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV.  L. REV.  1, 7-8  (1959).
" Fornaris  v.  Ridge Tool  Co., 400  U.S.  41  (1970).  Fornaris  involved  construction  of
the Puerto  Rican  Dealers  Contract  Law,  which  provided  that  local  dealers" contracts
with  manufacturers  were  terminable  by  the manufacturers  only  when  there was  "just
cause"  to terminate. Fornaris  sued  in  a Puerto Rican  court for damages resulting  from
an  allegedly  unlawful  termination,  and  defendant  Ridge  Tool  Company  removed  to
federal  district court  on  diversity  grounds.  The  district court  denied  the  defendant's
motion to dismiss  on  the ground  of the  alleged unconstitutionality of the  Dealers  Con-
tract Law,  whereupon  an interlocutory  appeal  pursuant  to 28  U.S.C. §  1292(b) (1970)
was  taken to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The  First  Circuit's  opinion,  423  F.2d  563  (1970),  notes  that the  Dealers  ContractTHE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
with all the costs it imposes, does not even necessarily lead to ob-
taining  that  state  supreme  court  pronouncement  which  is  the
raison d'&tre  for abstention!
II.  SHOULD PULLMAN ABSTENTION  BE  ABANDONED  IN  FAVOR
OF  A  CERTIFICATION  PROCEDURE?
The conclusion  I  would draw  from  all  this  is  that Pullman
abstention is not worth its costs.  If some means of receiving state
court input on unsettled issues of state law is  deemed necessary,
a certification procedure, under which a federal court that needs
clarification  of a state legal issue makes  its inquiry directly to  the
supreme court of the state, seems vastly superior. Certification is
currently  available  only  in states  that have  chosen  to  authorize
it.56 The procedure  is  frequently criticized  because  of the delay
Law  had been  considered  by the Superior Court of Puerto  Rico  in Construction  Mach.
& Supplies Corp. v.  Construction  Mach.  Co.,  Civ. No. 67-3349 (Super. Ct. of P.R.,  San
Juan Section  Dec.  23,  1968) and  had been upheld  in the face  of a similar constitutional
challenge.  423  F.2d  at  564.  Briefs  submitted  to  the  court* of  appeals  cited  the
Construction Machine &  Supplies case and  discussed  the superior court's treatment of the
"just cause" standard  in the  statute. Brief for Appellee  at 35-36,  38, Fornaris  v. Ridge
Tool  Co., 423  F.2d 563  (Ist  Cir.  1970)  (quoting the superior  court's  discussion  of 'just
cause");  Supplementary  Brief for Intervenor at 4, Fornaris v.  Ridge Tool  Co., 423 F.2d
563  (1st Cir. 1970)  (filed by  the  Commonwealth  of Puerto  Rico)  (citing the Construction
Machine &  Supplies opinion).  Although  noting  in dicta  that "[w]e  do not  agree with  the
position  of the  opponents  of the  act  that  the  phrase  'just cause'  is  unconstitutionally
vague  and unspecific,"  423  F.2d at 568, the court of appeals did hold the Dealers  Con-
tract Law  unconstitutional  because it retroactively  altered contractual  obligations  in vio-
lation of due process. Id. at 567.
In its brief per curiam  decision,  the Supreme Court reversed  and ordered  absten-
tion "until  the  Puerto  Rican Supreme  Court  has  authoritatively  ruled  on  the  local  law
question  in light of the  federal  claims."  400  U.S.  at 44  (footnote omitted).  Beginning
with  the proposition  that the  Dealers  Contract  Law  was  "a  rather vague  Puerto  Rican
law that the Supreme  Court of Puerto  Rico  has  not authoritatively construed,"  id. at 43
(footnote  omitted),  the  Court ignored  the  lower  Puerto  Rican  courts' construction  of
"just  cause"  that  had  been  presented  to  the  court  of appeals,  preferring  instead  the
authoritative  construction  of the term  yet to be rendered  by the supreme  court of the
Commonwealth. 56See,  e.g.,  COLO.  App.  R.  21.1;  FLA.  STAT.  §  25.031  (1946);  HAW.  REv.  STAT.
§ 602-36  (1965);  ME.  R.  Civ.  P. 76 B; N.H.  REv.  STAT.  ANN.  § 490 (1968)  (App.  R. 21);
WASH.  REV.  CODE  § 2.60 (1965).
Congress  could dispense with  the need  for state  authorization  and  require states  to
entertain  certified  questions.  See generally Kurland,  Mr. Justice Frankfurter,  The  Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in  Diversity Cases,  67  YALE  L.J.  187,  214  (1957);  44  ALl
PROCEEDINGS  130-31  (1967)  (remarks  of Professor  Wright).  But  cf. Note, Inter-jurisdic-
tional Certification: Beyond Abstention  Toward Cooperative  Judicial  Federalism,  111  U.  PA.  L.
REv.  344,  357-58  (1963)  (suggests  that compelling  state  courts  to  hear  certified  ques-
tions  is  not conducive  to cooperative  federalism,  which certification  should  foster).  No
congressional  statute  purports  to  require  state  courts  to  entertain  certified  questions,
however,  and  the  American  Law  Institute  proposal concerning  certified  questions  ex-
plicitly  disavowed  the  notion  of federal  compulsion.  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE,  supra
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in the federal  litigation it can cause."  The problem of delay can
be greatly  alleviated if the state expedites  treatment  of certified
questions,58  but  in  any  event  certification  seems  inevitably  less
time-consuming  and  less  costly  than  abstention,  because  the
question referred goes  directly  to the state supreme court.59 Not
only are  its costs less;  its benefits are greater. Although certifica-
tion could  share  the first  two problems  discussed  in  connection
with  abstention-the  question  can  be raised  whether  review  of
certification  orders  should  be allowed  and certification  can  be
used  as  a  delaying  tactic-it avoids  the critical third  problem,60
note  8, at 295.
Congressional  power would stem from  article  III in conjunction  with  the necessary
and  proper clause. It may  also be that article  III gives the  federal courts  power, without
any  congressional  authoritization,  to  compel  certification.  See Note, Consequences of Ab-
stention by A  Federal  Court, 73  HARV.  L. REv.  1358,  1368  (1960).
"7  See,  e.g.,  AMERICA,  LAW  INSTITUTE,  supra note  8,  at 293;  Mattis, Certification of
Questions of State Law: An Impractical  Tool in the Hands of Federal Courts, 23  U.  MIAMI  L.
REV.  717,  725-27  (1969).  But see  note 59  infra. See also In  re  Elliott,  74  Wash.  2d 600,
640-41,  446 P.2d  347,  371 (1968)  (Hale, J., dissenting).
5" Presumably  Congress  could  require  states  to  expedite, just  as  it  could  require
them to provide  a certification  procedure  in  the  first  instance. See note 56 supra. Alter-
natively,  the federal  courts could  decline  to utilize  a state's  mechanism  for certification
unless the state  gives priority  to certified  questions.  Query  whether such  a requirement
should be imposed,  however. See, Thiry v.  Atlantic Monthly Co.,  74 Wash.  2d 679,  684,
445 P.2d  1012,  1015  (1968)  (Hale, J.,  dissenting) (raising the question why  the certified
case  should  "have  been  given  a priority  over  the  several  hundred  cases  already  pend-
ing" when  nothing in its  facts warranted  unusually expeditious treatment).
59 justice  Wernick,  of the  Supreme Judicial  Court  of Maine,  states  not only  that
"the  extra costs  to the  litigants  in  money,  energy,  time and  general  inconvenience  are
likely  to  be  far  less  in  the  certification  process  than  in  [abstention],"  but  further  that
the  costs  are  "likely  in  any  event  to  be minimal."  White  v.  Edgar,  320  A.2d  668,  683
(Me.  1974).  He  also  says  that  "certification  is  likely to  provide  the  litigants  with  a  de-
cision  of the highest  court  of the State,  as  a definitive  determination  of the  state  law
issues,  almost as speedily as  they  would have the federal Court's (non-definitive)  decision  of
them (if the federal  court does  not  abstain)."  Id. (emphasis added).  He  concludes  that
litigants  probably would  consider whatever costs  there are "as, on balance, a price worth
paying for the enormous benefit of a reasonably speedy  definitive  determination  of the
state law questions." Id.
60 Moreover,  the  other  two  problems  are  lessened  to  the  extent  that  certification
involves  less  delay  than  abstention  does.  Obviously  there  is  less  temptation  to  use  a
procedure  as  a delaying  tactic  if it  results  in  less delay,  and  the  harm  in so  using  it is
also  reduced.  Apart  from  reducing  delay,  there  is  no  way  to  avoid  the  problem  of
misuse of certification, just  as  there  is  not  with  abstention.  It  seems  impossible  effec-
tively  to police  misuse  because  of the indefinite  standards for  abstention  and  certifica-
tion, and  it seems  impossible to  remove the  vagueness from the  standards  without fun-
damentally  altering  the  role  that abstention  and  certification  are  designed  to play. See
text accompanying  notes  62-68 infra. The  possibility of misuse,  therefore, seems  inher-
ent in  the doctrines.  That possibility  can be avoided  only  by abandoning  the  doctrines
or  by  truly  minimizing  the  delay  that  occurs  in  obtaining  clarification  of the  unclear
state  issue. See note 59 supra.
There  also  is  less  need  to  review  a  certification  order  if  little  cost  and  delay  is
required  to obtain  the state court's response than  if the order  burdens the parties moreTHE ABSTENTION  DOCTRINE TODAY
that of the unclear state  issue never reaching the state supreme
court, because  the  federal  court refers  the issue  there directly.
The balance between  costs  and benefits therefore  leaves  certifi-
cation  well  ahead  of abstention,  a  fact  the Supreme  Court  has
recognized recently in suggesting that it would allow certification
more  freely  than  abstention.6 1  If  the  federal judiciary  were  to
adopt  the suggestion  above  of  abandoning  the  abstention  doc-
trine  because  its  costs  outweigh  its  benefits,  but were  to  retain
certification,  more  states  might  allow  certification  to  their
judiciary, in order to fulfill their interest in providing the federal
judiciary with their court's answers to unsettled questions of state
law.
When a jurisdiction does subscribe  to certification, one issue
it must face is whether to allow certification only in those circum-
stances  in  which  abstention  has  heretofore  been  proper  or  in-
stead  to permit it more broadly. Insofar as the case for certifica-
tion  is  simply its  superiority  to  abstention  in  a lesser-evil  sense,
the  availability  of certification  might  be  limited  along Pullman
lines. Although the subjectiveness of a requirement that the state
issue  be unclear  is  troublesome  for  some  purposes,  a require-
ment of unclarity  should  certainly  be adopted  for  certification.
For unless  the certified  state  issue  is  quite  unclear,  there  is  no
need  for  certification; 62  the  federal  district court  could  safely
exercise its pendent jurisdiction  and decide the state  issue itself.
The other criteria  for Pullman abstention,  however,  should  not
be perpetuated, for they are not sound limitations  on an absten-
tion or a certification  doctrine. The most basic of these require-
ments  is  that the case  in which  state  advice  is  sought contain  a
federal  constitutional  issue.6 3  Another  arguable  requirement  is
severely. The degree of burden  to  the parties would be a factor as well  in determining
whether  an  order  could  be characterized  as  final  under  28  U.S.C.  §  1291  (1970).  See
note  18 supra & accompanying  text. Because  the  extent of delay will  vary from jurisdic-
tion  to jurisdiction,  depending  upon  such  things  as  the  extent of the  backlog of the
state supreme  court  and  whether  certified  questions  are given  priority on  the docket,
orders of certification  should  perhaps  be final and reviewable  in some jurisdictions  and
not in others.  If  the parties are substantially burdened by the order it should be review-
able, for  the same reasons abstention  orders should be,  and refusals  to certify certainly
should not be reviewable.  See notes 45-50 supra & accompanying text.
61 Bellotti  v.  Baird,  96 S.  Ct. 2857,  2867-68 (1976);  Lehman Bros.  v.  Schein,  416
U.S. 386, 390-91  (1974).
6'2 For a  case recognizing that a  certified  question  should  be unclear,  see Thiry  v.
Atlantic Monthly  Co.,  74 Wash.  2d 679, 682, 445 P.2d  1012,  1013 (1968).
63 Propper  v.  Clark, 337  U.S. 472,  490  (1949)  makes  it clear  that this  is  a require-
ment  of Pullman abstention.  See  also  Meredith  v.  Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228,  236
(1943).  Abstention  does not, however,  always  serve the interest of avoiding federal con-
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that the action be one to enjoin a state statute or program.6 4 One
reason  behind  these  traditional  limitations  on Pullman absten-
tion-limitations that are not always  followed  today65-may  be to
limit  abstention  to  cases  in  which  it  is  particularly  important
that  the  state  issue  be  correctly  decided.  I  would  suggest  re-
placing  the  specific  limitations  with  a  general  precondition  to
certification  that the state  issue  on  which  clarification  is  sought
be  an  important  one;  answering  the  issue  correctly  should  be
sufficiently  important that deferring  to  the state supreme court
is worth  the costs involved.66
It is much  more costly to  make a mistake  on some  state law
issues than others. Just as with Pullman abstention it has not been
deemed  worth  involving  two  jurisdictions  in  disputes  between
two  private  litigants  when  erroneous  decision  of the state  issue
would  not have  ramifications  beyond  the  immediate  parties,67
such disputes should not qualify for certification. At the opposite
extreme,  consider,  for  example,  a  case  concerning  a  right  to
treatment  to  be  inferred  from  a  state  constitutional  provision
that arguably  grants  the  right but that  well  may not.  Even  if a
stitutional  adjudication.  In  Railroad  Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.  496  (1941),  for
example, the  district court had  avoided  decision of the  federal  issues but the Supreme
Court  still  ordered  abstention,  thereby  furthering  the  different  purpose of avoiding
harm  to state  interests through  error  on  issues  of state  law.  If  abstention  can  be  or-
dered  when  it  serves  only  that purpose,  whether  or  not  the  case  contains  a  federal
constitutional  issue  should  be  irrelevant. The  holding of Louisiana  Light  & Power  Co.
v.  City  of Thibodaux,  360  U.S.  25  (1959),  supports  this  position,  although  the Court
adopted  another rationale. See generally Field, supra note  4, at 1093-106,  1136-38.
64 The  vast majority  of Pullman abstention  cases  fit this mold,  although occasionally
the  Supreme Court  had ordered  abstention  in cases  in  which no  arm of the state was  a
party, or in which only damages  were sought, without discussing its appropriateness. See
Fornaris  v.  Ridge Tool  Co.,  400 U.S.  41  (1970)  (per curiam); United Gas  Pipe Line  Co.
v.  Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S.  134 (1962)  (per curiam).
" See note 64 supra.
66 Of course,  in  those jurisdictions  that manage  truly  to  minimize  the  costs-by
devices  such  as  giving  certified  questions  priority  on  their  dockets-see  note 59 supra,
the  calculus of how  readily to abstain  would be  different  than  in those jurisdictions  in
which certification  is more time-consuming.
67  1 take this  to be the rationale  of the Pullman limitations,  a rationale  reflected  in
Meredith  v. Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228  (1943),  which held  abstention unavailable  in a
simple  diversity  case.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  a  decision  may  have  broad
ramifications  even  if the  state  is  not a party  (or if other  traditional  limitations  are  not
met).  If, for  example, a  federal cotrt, in  an  action between  private  parties erroneously
strikes down  a  state taxing  provision,  that decision  might  have  as severe  consequences
for  the  state  as  if  it  were  party  to  the  action.  Cf. United  Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Ideal
Cement  Co.,  369  U.S.  134  (1962)  (per  curiam) (vacating judgment of court  of appeals
to allow  construction  of city tax  ordinance by  state courts  in contract  suit between  pri-
vate  parties in which  the court of appeals had  held  the tax  ordinance  invalid under the
commerce clause).  If  so,  it should  qualify  for certification  withQut regard  to whether  it
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federal district court believes that the state supreme court would
recognize  the  right, such  an  important  announcement  of state
policy  arguably  should  be  made  by  the  state judicial  system
rather  than  the federal.  At least the federal court that is  ruling
on the  issue  should  require  of itself more certainty  in the  cor-
rectness of its result than it would were the issue less significant;
if in doubt on such  an important  issue,  the court should  refer
the question to  the state system more readily than it would refer
a less important issue.
6 8
An  obvious  disadvantage  of  a  prerequisite  to  certification
that relates  to  the importance  of correct resolution  of the state
law issue is the subjectivity and indefiniteness of that criterion. It
is as vulnerable to  these  criticisms  as the unclarity requirement,
the  indefiniteness  of which  is  the  source  of the  problems  dis-
cussed  earlier  concerning  review  of  abstention  decisions  and
misuse  of the  abstention  procedure.  Nonetheless,  the aid of the
state  judicial  system  should  not  be  sought  except  when  the
ramifications  of a wrong  decision  in the  particular  case  will be
felt widely and deeply enough to justify the costs of involving the
state judiciary. And it is better to address directly the question of
the  importance  of correct  decision  than  it  is  to  adopt  a  set of
criteria  (like  the  traditional  Pullman limitations)  that  overall
probably relate to the more significant  cases but that may or may
not  accurately  reflect  the  importance  of ruling  correctly  in  a
particular case.
If certification  is  limited  to  situations  in  which  state  law  is
extremely unclear and in which  a mistake  on the state  law issue
could have serious  ramifications, and if the delays  in the certifi-
cation procedure can be kept to a minimum, certification may be
a satisfactory answer to  the abstention dilemma.
6' The purpose  in avoiding state  law error in some  cases will  not be to avoid  harm
to state  interests but instead  to avoid  unnecessary  decision of federal  constitutional  is-
sues.  If,  for  example,  a  state  statute  is  challenged  as  violative of both  the  state  and
federal  constitutions,  and  the federal district judge, in the  absence  of abstention,  would
uphold  the statute  under state  law,  the interest abstention  serves  is  avoiding unneces-
sary  decision  of federal  constitutional  issues.  Or, if a  state statute  is  challenged  under
the  Federal Constitution  alone, and  the statute could be interpreted  in such  a  way  that
the  federal constitutional  issue would be avoided,  abstention  by a federal judge who  in
the absence  of abstention  would interpret the statute to raise the constitutional  issue will
further  the purpose of avoiding  constitutional  litigation.  See also  notes  50  & 63 supra.
A  requirement  that it be  important to  decide  the state issue  correctly,  in cases  in
which  the  purpose  of  abstention  is  to  avoid  federal  constitutional  decisionmaking,
would  call  for a judgment  whether  the constitutional  question  is of a  type that  should
be avoided.  If  it were  a routine  or settled  question  for example,  the importance crite-
rion would not be satisfied and certification  would be improper.
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